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Financial performance explanations and
institutional setting
Walter Aerts and Ann Tarca*
Abstract – The aim of this study is to investigate whether country differences in the institutional setting for financial
reporting affect the attributes of managers’ explanations of performance in management commentary reports. We include 172
listed companies from five industries (building materials, food processors, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and retail) in the
UK, Australia, the USA and Canada in 2003. We find significant country differences in attributional properties of
performance explanations in management commentary reports. The US and Canadian companies are generally less assertive
and less defensive in causal explanations offered compared to their counterparts in the UK and Australia. The North
American companies are also more extensive and formal in their explanations, relying more heavily on technical-accounting
language. These tendencies are most pronounced in the USA, where the aggregate of private and public enforcement is
greatest. Taken together, our evidence suggests that higher expected regulatory and litigation costs induce a more elaborative,
but risk-averse explanatory stance that may well reduce the overall incremental value of the explanations offered.
Keywords: management discussion and analysis (MD&A); operating and financial review (OFR); regulation;
enforcement; litigation; attributional statements
1. Introduction
The aim of this study is to investigate the attributes
of performance explanations in narrative accounting
reports in a cross-country setting. Narrative reports
often accompany companies’ financial statements,
to give a view of the company ‘through the eyes
of management’ (ASB, 2003; SEC, 1989).
Explanations of earnings and related performance
outcomes make up a large part of the management
commentary. A recent survey of the Fortune Global
500 companies’ narrative reporting reveals that 56%
of narrative reporting relates to explaining perform-
ance outcomes (PwC, 2007). Explanations occur
whenever content moves beyond the mere offering
of information to matters of meaning, relationships,
causes, factors, and reasons (Keil, 2006). By
offering incremental information about the link
between a performance outcome and its internal and
external antecedents, narrative explanations are a
useful extension of the financial reporting model
(Baginski et al., 2000; Baginski et al., 2008).
In this study we consider the effect of a
company’s national institutional environment
(with its embedded regulatory control mechanisms
and litigation risk) on the explanatory statements in
a company’s management commentary. We
hypothesise that differences in expected regulatory
and litigation costs may lead to significantly
different explanatory attitudes between companies
and qualitatively different information content in
narrative reports. Prior research on regulation and
litigation-related disclosure incentives has mainly
focused on disclosure behaviour with regard to
earnings forecasts, conference calls and earnings
announcements (Skinner, 1994; Francis et al., 1994;
Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009). We extend this
research by considering how these incentives affect
the way companies cope with demands for decision-
useful performance explanations in management
commentary reports. The issue is important as
concerns have been raised about the extent of
generic and ‘boilerplate’ disclosures in narrative
reports (SEC, 2003; FRC, 2007). In this vein, we
examine properties of the attributional (or explana-
tory) framing of financial performance outcomes
and consider how they differ between countries. By
properties of attributional framing we mean the
characteristics of explanations such as their relative
occurrence, complexity, consistency, type of argu-
ment used and self-serving propensity. By observ-
ing differences in attributional properties of
disclosure between companies from qualitatively
different institutional environments, we are able to
make inferences about managers’ beliefs about the
relationship between attributional statements and
expected regulatory and litigation costs.
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We select four common law countries (the USA,
Canada, the UK and Australia) where public
information dissemination is central to efficient
capital markets but there are differences in expected
regulatory and litigation costs. At the time of the
study, companies from the USA and Canada
provided management discussion and analysis
(MD&A) reports in response to mandatory require-
ments while companies in the UK and Australia
followed best-practice guidelines. With regard to
the institutional setting, of which the mandatory and
voluntary regimes are part, the UK is generally
perceived as having the lowest and the USA the
highest expected regulatory and litigation costs,
with Australia and Canada occupying something of
a middle position (Khurana and Raman, 2004;
Seetharaman et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2006). The
issue of regulatory and litigation costs is linked to
whether the reporting regime is mandatory or
voluntary, but it goes beyond the type of regime
to represent the broader setting in which financial
reporting occurs. We analyse the MD&A or oper-
ating and financial review (OFR) reports of 172
listed companies from five industries (building
materials, food processors, pharmaceuticals, bio-
technology and retail) for the 2003 financial year.
Consistent with prior research on the effects of
accountability pressures on individual and organ-
isational behaviour (e.g. Tetlock, 1999), we expect
that environments with more regulation and moni-
toring and higher potential litigation risk will lead to
more detailed and formal explanations of perform-
ance which feature more consistent presentation
traits and less self-serving bias.
Our results are generally consistent with these
predictions. Companies from the USA and Canada
are relatively less assertive and less defensive in
their explanations than their counterparts in the UK
and Australia.1 The North American companies
include more and more extensive explanations and
are more likely to use more formal language and to
rely more on technical-accounting explanations
relative to causal explanations. The effects identi-
fied are strongest for companies from the USA,
whereMD&A reports are mandatory and public and
private enforcement is highest. Our evidence sug-
gests that higher expected regulatory and litigation
costs bring companies to display significant effort to
explain performance outcomes but in a risk-averse
way, thereby constraining the type of explanations
which have been shown to be the most revealing
(Baginski et al., 2000, 2004) and tending towards
‘boilerplate’ disclosures, by making extensive use
of easily replicable, intermediary technical-
accounting explanations.
Our study extends the literature in several ways.
First, we add to prior international studies compar-
ing features of management commentary reports
(Collins et al., 1993; Beattie and McInnes, 2006;
PwC, 2007) by focusing on the attributional
framing in those reports. Second, we extend the
literature on attributional properties in narrative
reports (Aerts, 1994, 2005; Clatworthy and Jones,
2003, 2006) by using an international comparative
setting. Prior research on attributional statements
generally relies on a one-country setting and ignores
the impact of country-level characteristics. A third
area of contribution relates to providing empirical
evidence about the impact of the institutional
environment and related enforcement differences
on the content of management commentary reports.
We show detailed differences in attributional fram-
ing in institutional settings which vary with regard
to the extent of mandatory requirements and
expected regulatory and litigation costs, suggesting
that these differences drive explanatory patterns to a
considerable extent. We also add to studies about
the impact of litigation-related incentives on dis-
closure behaviour (Francis et al., 1994; Skinner,
1994, 1997; Rogers et al., 2009), which will be of
interest to market participants and regulators.
2. Background and hypotheses
We propose that between-country differences in
institutional setting will affect the properties of
performance explanations contained in manage-
ment commentary reports. In this section we
provide an overview of the differences in the
institutional setting of the four countries selected for
study. We also present relevant prior research about
attributional statements and develop our hypoth-
eses.
2.1. Institutional setting
At the time of the study (2003) narrative reports
were provided in response to mandatory regulations
in the USA and Canada and voluntary best-practice
guidelines in the UK and Australia (see Table 1).
There are many similarities in the frameworks of the
UK and Australia, which have legal systems with
common origins and a system of company regula-
tion through common and statute law. There was
considerable guidance and encouragement to pro-
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/11/2010 03 ABR Aerts.3d Page 422 of 450
1 In general, assertiveness in explanations refers to the
tendency to acclaim positive outcomes and explain them more
from internal than external causal antecedents, whereas defen-
siveness in explanations relates to the tendency to deny
responsibility for negative outcomes and explain negative
outcomes more from external than internal causal antecedents.
Specific measurements capturing these tendencies are shown in
Appendix 1.
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vide management commentary information, but
disclosure in UK and Australian companies’ reports
was largely of a voluntary nature. In contrast in the
USA the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has promulgated many requirements relating
to the form and content of management reports. In
Canada the Canadian Securities Administrators
(CSA) require listed companies to provide an
MD&A. The stated aim of the MD&A and its
required topics are similar in the USA and Canada
(Table 1). Although the reports are mandatory and
there is extensive guidance about content, the actual
items included and the way they are discussed is
under the discretion of management and thus may
reflect both company factors and the institutional
setting in which they are made.
The general objective of the rules/guidance is to
promote detailed discussion to assist users’ inter-
pretations of the information provided in the
financial statements. The explanations provided
become part of the accountability mechanisms
operating within listed companies’ institutional
environments. Accountability mechanisms refer to
the means by which companies are held responsible
and answerable for past decisions and actions. They
include narrative reports as well as other reporting
and governance mechanisms.
Accountability mechanisms hold both threats and
opportunities. Accountability pressures increase
with the demands of external constituencies and
with the perceived severity of potential sanctions.
On the other hand, they create generally accepted
channels through which relevant stakeholders can
be persuaded to grant approval of the company’s
position and performance and provide continued
support. Within a public accountability context, it is
hard to argue that explanations in narrative reports
are simply the outcome of an internalised and
communicated data analysis process. Companies
are likely to develop coping strategies in their
explanations, depending on the nature of what has
to be explained and the context in which the causal
claims are made, including the audience to whom
the company is accountable (Edelman, 1977;
Gardner and Martinko, 1988; Tetlock, 1985, 1999).
Research in an accountability setting suggests
that perceptions of the relevant audiences and of
related rewards and sanctions are likely to signifi-
cantly affect performance explanations of those
held accountable (Gibbins and Newton, 1994;
Johns, 1999; Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock and Lerner,
1999; Weick, 1995). Audience characteristics and
embedded rewards and sanctions have been shown
to be effective determinants of coping behaviour at
an interpersonal level, but operate in functionally
equivalent ways at the (inter) organisational level
(Elsbach, 2003; Harrison et al., 1988; Suchman,
1995; Weick, 1995). Moreover, within a formal
institutional setting, regulatory and legal mechan-
isms tend to enforce accountability processes. Such
mechanisms usually strengthen accountability
demands and lead to increased institutional scrutiny
pressures, which may affect the relative costs and
rewards of argumentation choices in management
commentary reports.
The institutional settings of the four sample
countries involve developed market economies
with legal systems based on a common law
regulatory framework (La Porta et al., 1997,
1998). However, there are important differences
between the countries in relation to both public and
private enforcement mechanisms whichmay impact
on attributional statements.2 A primary public
enforcement difference between the countries rele-
vant to management commentary relates to the
extent to which MD&A reporting is mandatory or
mainly voluntary. The presence of explicit rules of
compliance in a mandatory reporting regime facili-
tates both public and private enforcement actions
and, thus, heightens perceived regulatory and
litigation costs.3
However, even within a mandatory regime the
extent of active monitoring and enforcement of
mandatory rules differs. Public enforcement actions
have been taken in relation to MD&A reports in the
USA but not in Canada. The SEC has required
companies to amend and expand their MD&A
filings and, in some cases, imposed large fines for
inadequate and misleading disclosure (SEC,
2004b). While the cases may not relate specifically
to performance explanations, they illustrate that
companies in the USA operate in an environment
where enforcement action has been taken in relation
toMD&A reports. In contrast, the minimal nature of
mandatory rules in the UK and Australia (at the time
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/11/2010 03 ABR Aerts.3d Page 423 of 450
2 Public enforcement involves the use of a public agent such
as a regulatory body to detect and sanction violations of
normative rules. Public regulatory bodies use their power a
priori (by stipulating mandatory rules of compliance) and a
posteriori (by imposing sanctions and penalties). Private
enforcement operates through civil law suits brought by private
parties under existing contract and tort law.
3 The USA operates a more closely regulated system with
regard to MD&A disclosures. The SEC has a supervisory role in
the creation and application of MD&A rules. In the USA and
Canada the regulators monitor the information provided. Like
their counterparts the SEC, the Canadian Securities
Administrators (CSA) have contacted companies directly
requesting re-submission of MD&A reports (Clarkson et al.,
1994). In addition, the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants (CICA) has provided guidance, which is supported
by the CSA (IASCF, 2005).
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of our study) inhibits regulatory action and thus
minimises regulatory costs in these countries.
The voluntary versus mandatory nature of
MD&A reporting is, however, endogenous to the
wider institutional environment in which company
reporting functions. In this regard, La Porta et al.
(2006) provide useful measures of public and
private enforcement to quantify inter-country dif-
ferences in expected regulatory and litigation costs.
They propose that the USA has the highest level of
enforcement for both the litigation standard (1.00)
and the public enforcement index (0.90) and the UK
the lowest (0.66 and 0.68, respectively). Averaging
both indices to provide an overall measure which
captures both public and private enforcement and
thereby proxies for the general regulatory and
litigation environment in the four countries, we get
the following country ranking: (1) USA average of
0.95, (2) Canada average of 0.90, (3) Australia
average of 0.78, and (4) UK average of 0.67.4 We
will use this ranking to differentiate expected
regulatory and litigation costs across the four
countries. The ranking is consistent with previous
research identifying significant differences in liti-
gation risk among the sample countries (Ball et al.,
2000; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Baginski et al.,
2002; Seetharaman et al., 2002; Hughes and Sankar,
2006). Litigation risk is far greater in the USA than
in Canada, the UK and Australia (Seetharaman et
al., 2002; Khurana and Raman, 2004). Moreover,
Ball et al. (2000) argue that expected litigation costs
are lower in the UK than in Australia, Canada and
the USA. With regard to public enforcement,
Bhattacharya (2006) documents that the SEC
enforces securities laws much more vigorously
than their Canadian counterparts. The SEC has
taken several enforcement actions against regis-
trants in relation to MD&A, including the Edison
Schools Inc., Sony Corporation, Caterpillar Inc.,
American Express Company and Bank of Boston
Corporation and K-Mart cases (SEC 2005a, 2005b).
Similar cases have not occurred in Canada, the UK
and Australia.
2.2. Attributional properties of management
commentary
Explanatory patterns within the context of account-
ing narratives have been studied on several occa-
sions, mainly from an attribution theory perspective
(Aerts, 1994, 2001, 2005; Bettman and Weitz,
1983; Baginski et al., 2004, 2008; Clatworthy and
Jones, 2003, 2006; Merkl-Davies and Brennan,
2007; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Staw et al.,
1983). Attribution theory relates to how people
explain the causes and antecedents of events. It
focuses on perceived causality: people’s inferences
about what causes things to happen and why things
happen as they do. Attributional statements are
narrative statements reflecting a cause-effect or
antecedent-consequence relationship.
Numerous authors demonstrate a corporate ten-
dency to attribute positive effects or outcomes in the
annual reports to the company’s own actions or
corporate origins (company strategy, decisions,
know-how, human resources potential) and nega-
tive outcomes to external events or chance factors
(business climate, inflation, market prices, govern-
ment policy, weather) (Baginski et al., 2000;
Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Clapham and Schwenk,
1991; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Hooghiemstra,
2003, 2008; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Tsang,
2002; Wagner and Gooding, 1997). This explan-
ation style is considered as self-serving because
situations and events are defined to the company’s
own advantage. The self-serving explanation pat-
tern can be decomposed into an assertive compon-
ent (stressing the importance, relevance and scope
of positive outcomes or actions) and more defensive
characteristics (downplaying the significance of
negatively evaluated events). In general, assertive
tendencies refer to framing positive outcomes in
such a way that their effect is heightened through
entitlements, enhancements and selective positive-
ness of the image presented. Defensive tendencies
relate to excuses, justifications, and denials of
negative effects (Gardner and Martinko, 1988;
Elsbach, 1994, 2003) (See Appendix 1 for further
detail of definitions). Prior research also points to a
pattern of intentional attributional search for posi-
tive news when overall performance declines
(Aerts, 2005; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003;
Elsbach and Kramer, 1996), accompanied by a
tendency to substitute negative overall earnings
measures by fractional earnings measures of a
positive kind (e.g. on divisional, subgroup or
segmental level).
Explanations in annual report narratives are
frequently expressed through formal accounting
language, with its specific terminology and inherent
calculative relationships. Such technical-account-
ing explanations use the internal logic of the
financial accounting model, relating intermediary
accounting effects and categories, in order to make
sense of and rationalise corporate performance
outcomes (Edelman, 1977). Such formal language
explanations are inherently ambiguous as the con-
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/11/2010 03 ABR Aerts.3d Page 425 of 450
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public enforcement index. The corresponding scores for
Australia are 0.66 and 0.9.
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cepts and relationships that they reflect tend to be
analytical and not descriptive like causal explan-
ations expressed in natural language. Research
shows that the use of accounting explanations tends
to be biased relative to the tenor of the accounting
outcome that is explained (Aerts, 1994;
Hooghiemstra, 2003), with positive performance
outcomes explained more in explicit cause-effect
terminology and less through technical-accounting
explanations.
2.3. Hypotheses
We argue that regulatory and legal mechanisms that
enforce accountability processes increase expected
external scrutiny, thus affecting preparation of
performance explanations. Although the outcome
of formal legal and regulatory scrutiny is highly
uncertain and related litigation is activated only in
exceptional cases, higher expected regulatory and
litigation costs are likely to heighten the ex ante
salience of accountability predicaments resulting
from companies’ explanatory activities and create
the countervailing interests that compel companies
to become more self-conscious about the conse-
quences of disclosure about their performance.
More specifically, we argue that higher scrutiny
pressures coming from higher expected regulatory
and litigation costs bring about a disclosure envir-
onment in which explanatory effort is promoted,
self-presentational tendencies are reduced and more
formal disclosure positions prevail.
2.3.1. Explanatory effort
Stronger regulatory and legal accountability mech-
anisms increase accountability demands upon com-
panies and are expected to affect information
processing and related framing of performance
disclosures. Accountability research within the
domain of social psychology and organisational
behaviour points out that, in understanding the
effect of accountability on behaviour, it is important
to distinguish between situations in which the actor
is aware of accountability demands before or after
the act in question (pre- versus post-decisional
accountability) (Tetlock and Lerner, 1999). Pre-
decisional accountability induces more self-critical,
integrated, complex ways of reasoning and a more
consistent way of handling evaluative content
(i.e. recognising both good and bad features of
particular events and explaining good and bad news
consistently) (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). Kunda
(1990) documents that such circumstances lead to
more cognitive effort on issue-related reasoning,
with deeper and more careful information handling
and often with use of more complex rules. Pre-
decisional accountability tends to affect the length
of the actor’s analysis and evaluation of evidence
but also its complexity.
Higher expected regulatory and litigation costs
heighten the ex ante salience of accountability
predicaments arising from companies’ explanatory
activities and lead to a situation that is functionally
equivalent to pre-decisional accountability. In a
comparable vein, Johns (1999) argues that the
extent to which public accountability is accompan-
ied by actual or anticipated feedback prompts a
situation of what he calls ‘proactive scrutiny’.
Proactive scrutiny typically promotes the use of
argument as an appropriate way to display ration-
ality and encourages cognitive effort in the sense of
a more intense attributional search when perform-
ance outcomes are disclosed (Gibbins and Newton,
1994; Staw, 1980; Weick, 1983). Proactive scrutiny
would not only affect the amount of explanatory
activity but also its quality, which encompasses
consideration of a greater number of alternatives
and more evidence.
The above arguments suggest that higher
expected regulatory and litigation costs are likely
to increase the relative amount of reported account-
ing outcomes that are explained (density of attribu-
tion statements) and/or the number of explanations
offered for each accounting outcome (depth of
attribution statements). The explanatory or cogni-
tive effort argument leads to the following hypoth-
esis:
H1: In an institutional setting with higher expected
regulatory and litigation costs companies offer
more explanations for financial performance
outcomes (density of explanations and depth
of explanations).
2.3.2. Inconsistency in explanatory format for
positive versus negative content
A more self-critical approach induced by higher
accountability pressures usually involves more
tolerance for evaluative inconsistency (Lerner and
Tetlock, 1999), meaning that both positive and
negative features of performance outcomes are
recognised and explained. Pre-decisional account-
ability motivates more vigilant information pro-
cessing and brings people to consider arguments on
both sides of an issue and to employmore consistent
patterns of reasoning and cue utilisation (Hagafors
and Brehmer, 1983; Tetlock, 1999). These findings
suggest that under higher scrutiny positive and
negative outcomes would be treated more consist-
ently in terms of extent or nature of explanation.
Where prior research (Aerts, 1994, 2005;
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Clatworthy and Jones, 2003, 2006) documents a
tendency to prefer causal explanations for positive
outcomes (informality bias on positive outcomes),
scrutiny forces would reduce such a tendency and
promote less bias in how positive versus negative
accounting outcomes are explained. In this regard,
less inconsistency in explanatory format for posi-
tive versus negative content would imply that both
types of outcome are explained more similarly in
terms of type of explanation offered (causal
explanation versus formal technical-accounting
explanation) with a less biased use of each type of
explanation for positive and negative outcomes (a
phenomenon we refer to as ‘valence inconsistency
in formality of explanations’) or in terms of the
number of explanations offered for each positive
versus negative outcome (referred to as ‘valence
inconsistency in depth of explanations’).
This leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: In an institutional setting with higher expected
regulatory and litigation costs companies
exhibit less inconsistency in explanatory for-
mat for positive versus negative financial
performance outcomes (valence inconsistency
in formality of explanations and valence
inconsistency in depth of explanations).
2.3.3. Formality of explanations
Sutton and Galunic (1996) argue that intense
external scrutiny causes managers to focus attention
and effort on symbolic activities and on well-
rehearsed acts and to follow injunctive rather than
descriptive norms. Accordingly, scrutiny pressures
may promote a tendency to opt for explanations of
performance outcomes that are socially well-
endorsed, non-controversial and easily justifiable
(Scott and Lyman, 1968). Formal technical-
accounting explanations, which feature a kind of
tautological reiteration of accounting’s logical rela-
tionships, provide such generally accepted, salient
and consensual explanations (Gowler and Legge,
1983; Aerts, 1994, Hooghiemstra, 2003). By their
socially constructed and intermediary nature, they
are analytical but not descriptive of actual causality
(Hines, 1988). They do, however, reflect injunctive
norms as they arise from generally accepted ways of
analysing and presenting performance measures.
Moreover, technical-accounting explanations are,
in essence, litigation-proof in that they avoid
making explicit assignment of responsibility and
difficult value tradeoffs in describing causal influ-
ences. In that sense, they may be preferred to causal
disclosures in an environment characterised by
higher litigation risk such as the USA.
Moreover, neo-institutional theory argues that the
more institutionalised the environment in which
managers operate, the more interactions and
accountability relationships become ritualised and
over-learned (Weick, 1995). Such conditions may
promote the use of more formal and rigid explan-
ations in the context of periodic management
commentaries. Formal technical-accounting
explanations may be particularly prone to a kind
of programmed processing of disclosures, leading
to ‘boilerplate’ disclosures. In this regard, Nelson
and Pritchard (2007) show that US MD&A disclo-
sures are increasingly ‘sticky’ with a general
tendency to ‘cut and paste’ disclosure from the
prior year. Such a tendency may result in more rigid
argumentation patterns in explaining accounting
outcomes, with a preference for replicable, easily
defensible and socially endorsed explanatory cat-
egories (Tetlock, 1985, 1999). Technical-account-
ing explanations, with their self-evident and
uncontroversial character, may be prone to auto-
matic processing of narrative disclosure scripts and
could easily lead to programmed, ritual-like
explanatory disclosures. Thus the following
hypothesis is proposed:
H3: In an institutional setting with higher expected
regulatory and litigation costs companies use
more formal explanations of financial per-
formance outcomes (relative use of technical
accounting explanations, informality bias on
positive outcomes).
2.3.4. Self-serving explanations
Jones and Pittman (1982) argue that the more
institutionalised the environment in which explan-
ations for success and failure are offered, the less
impression management is likely to be involved.
Moreover, behavioural accountability research
demonstrates that actors temper their self-enhance-
ment tendencies when they expect to face a
judgmental evaluator post hoc (Sedikides and
Herbst, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2002; Johns, 1999).
This suggests that proactive scrutiny, associated
with higher expected regulatory and litigation costs,
is likely to attenuate self-serving behaviour.
Partial empirical support for this argument comes
from the few cross-country or replication studies
(Hooghiemstra, 2008; Tsang, 2002) that demon-
strate that the significantly stronger self-presenta-
tional biases generally found in US samples relative
to Asian samples (Mezulis et al., 2004) could not be
replicated (and were even reversed for defensive
tendencies) within the institutionalised context of
annual report narratives, suggesting that the differ-
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ential institutional setting of the Asian versus the
US capital market significantly constrains and even
inverses generally expected cultural differences in
self-presentational behaviour. When the explana-
tory process itself is under high scrutiny, as is the
case in the USA, self-presentation needs get less
priority or become less important because the
dominant audience’s response will be based on an
assessment of the characteristics or quality of the
framing process, and less on the performance
outcome itself (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). Rogers
and Van Buskirk (2009) indicate that the litigation
process in the USA leads to companies decreasing
disclosures for which they may later be held
accountable, despite the protection offered by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
This is consistent with the view that US MD&A
disclosure is increasingly scrutinised, internally and
externally, through a legal lens. Self-serving explan-
ations may be especially targeted (and avoided) in
this respect, leading to the following hypothesis:
H4: In an institutional setting with higher expected
regulatory and litigation costs companies
exhibit less self-serving tendencies in financial
performance explanations (assertive causal
bias, defensive causal bias, use of entitlements
and enhancements, use of excuses, justifica-
tions and causality denials).
3. Data and method
3.1. Sample selection
The four countries selected for this study (the USA,
Canada, the UK and Australia) were chosen
because capital markets are important sources of
company finance in each country. Company dis-
closure is likely to be important for a number of
reasons, which reflect aspects of capital markets
such as raising external capital, demonstrating
managerial talent and securing compensation
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). The selection of the
four countries allows us to investigate attribution
patterns in management commentary reports where
all companies have incentives to provide informa-
tion, but there are differences in their institutional
setting. Listed companies were selected because our
focus was on public accountability.
Prior research suggests that company size and
industry membership are associated with disclosure
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 1996; Beattie et al.,
2002, 2004; Hooks and Moon, 1993; Cole and
Jones, 2004). To control for industry effects, we
selected our sample from only five industries
(building materials, food processors, pharmaceut-
icals, biotechnology and retail).
We selected the three largest companies in each
industry group in each country (n = 60) (based on a
Datastream list of the largest 500 companies by
market capitalisation in each country) so that the
companies likely to provide the most disclosure in
each industry were included. However, the largest
companies in each country differed markedly in size
between countries, with Australian and Canadian
companies being significantly smaller and US
companies being significantly larger than average.
Therefore, in the second stage of sample selection
we selected companies based on their relative size.
We calculated each company’s relative size based
on its market capitalisation as a proportion of the
total market capitalisation for its country. Within
each industry group in each country, we grouped
companies into deciles based on relative market
capitalisation (excluding the largest three com-
panies, which are included in stage one) from
largest to smallest. Within each decile, we then
selected four firms (one from each country) which
were of a similar size (defined as having a relative
market size that was within a 5% range) to give up
to ten additional companies in each country from
each industry.5
The number of companies selected in the second
stage differs between countries because it reflects
the number of companies in the industry group for
each country and the number which could be size
matched across the four countries. For example, the
UK and Australia had relatively more listed com-
panies in the building materials sector than the USA
and Canada, so the UK and Australian samples are
larger in this sector. In the pharmaceuticals sector,
there were more listed companies in the USA and
Canada from which to select the sample companies
so the sample in this sector has more US and
Canadian companies than Australian and UK
companies. Thus the final sample comprises both
the three largest companies in each industry in each
country (from the first stage) and well as a number
of additional companies (based on relative size)
from the second stage.
The sample selection in the second stage was
helpful because we have included many companies
of similar relative size, however it did result in an
unequal distribution of companies across countries
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/11/2010 03 ABR Aerts.3d Page 428 of 450
5 For example, in the food producer group in relative size
decile 0.40–0.49, we selected (AUS) SPC Ardmona 0.0449,
(UK) Dairy Crest Group 0.0412, (USA) Dean Foods 0.0427 and
(CAN) Canada Bread 0.0676. Relative size difference (max-
imum less minimum) expressed as a percentage = 6.7% – 4.1%
= 2.6%. If the decile group did not include four companies, we
included only the number available (e.g. for the decile 0.20–
0.29 we included three companies (AUS) Select Harvests 0.027,
(UK) Geest 0.0258 and (USA) Bunge 0.0274.
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and industries. Nevertheless, there are sufficient
companies in each industry and company group to
allow valid inferences to be drawn at the country
level. The final sample includes 172 companies,
with 51 (30%) from the USA, 36 (21%) from
Canada, 47 (27%) from the UK and 38 (22%) from
Australia. Representation from industry groups was
as follows: building materials 25 companies (15%);
food processors 36 (21%); pharmaceuticals 34
(20%); biotechnology 40 (23%) and retail 37
(21%) (Table 2). The final sample is 75% of the
population 230.6 The proportion of sample com-
panies/population is generally high (building mater-
ials 89%, food processors 78%, pharmaceuticals
81%; biotechnology 95% and retail 51%, Table 2)
suggesting that the final sample is likely to be
representative of the population.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the
sample companies. Significant differences between
companies from the four countries are observed for
several attributes. The US and UK companies are
larger and followed by more analysts than the
Australian and Canadian companies. The UK
companies are more international than average,
with a higher proportion of foreign revenue and
more US foreign listings. The sample includes 11
UK, four Canadian and four Australian companies
with a 20-F listing. The UK and Australian
companies rank more highly than average on the
corporate governance composite score (a score out
of three, where 1 is added if the board chair is a non-
executive director, the majority of the board are
independent directors and the company uses a
committee structure, i.e. audit, nomination and
remuneration committees). Most companies are
audited by a Big 4 company (USA 94%, Canada
92% and the UK 98%). Australia has a lower
proportion of Big 4 audited companies (71%).
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Table 2
Sample selection by country and industry
Industry USA % Canada % UK % Australia % Industry
total
% Population Sample
%
Building materials 4 8 5 14 7 15 9 23 25 15 28 89
Largest three companies 3 3 3 3 12
Additional companies 1 2 4 6 13
Food processors 11 22 8 22 10 21 7 19 36 21 46 78
Largest three companies 3 3 3 3 12
Additional companies 8 5 7 4 24
Pharmaceuticals 12 23 8 22 7 15 7 19 34 20 42 81
Largest three companies 3 3 3 3 12
Additional companies 9 5 4 4 22
Biotechnology 13 25 10 28 10 21 7 19 40 23 42 95
Largest three companies 3 3 3 3 12
Additional companies 10 7 7 4 28
Retail 11 22 5 14 13 28 8 20 37 21 72 51
Largest three companies 3 3 3 3 12
Additional companies 8 2 10 5 25
Total 51 30 36 21 47 27 38 22 172 100 230 75
This table shows the sample selection by industry and country. Industry groups are based on Datastream
industry classifications. Each industry group includes the three largest companies (based on market
capitalisation at 31 December 2003) and up to ten additional companies, subject to the number of companies
in the industry as per Datastream lists of the largest 500 companies in each country. The additional
companies are selected by matching companies based on similar relative market size (company market
capitalisation/total country market capitalisation). The number of companies within the largest 500 in each
country is shown by industry group in the column headed ‘population’ and the proportion of companies in
the sample is shown in the column headed ‘Sample’.
6 The population for each country is the companies in the five
industry groups located in the largest 500 companies by market
capitalisation.
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Companies do not differ significantly in whether
they experienced a change in profitability in the year
of study. Only the Canadian sample had more loss-
making companies (44%) than average (26%) and,
not surprisingly, the market-to-book ratio was lower
than average for Canadian companies.
The year 2003 was selected to capture existing
differences in the institutional environment for
management commentary reports. As noted
above, regulators in the USA and Canada required
mandatory reports. In 2003 reports in the UK and
Australia reflected primarily voluntary recommen-
dations. By 2004 the UK had announced the
introduction of mandatory reports (an initiative
later withdrawn) (FRC, 2005) and Australia intro-
duced requirements for management discussion and
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Full sample
N = 172
Mean
(Std dev.)
USA
N = 51
Mean
(Z statistic)
Canada
N = 36
Mean
(Z statistic)
UK
N = 47
Mean
(Z statistic)
Australia
N = 38
Mean
(Z statistic)
Panel A
Size 7,922.28 18,273.74 630.62 7,726.19 715.66
(28,344.70) (***5.60) (***3.53) (*1.73) (***4.63)
Change in leverage 0.00 0.22 –0.20 –0.04 –0.07
(2.84) (0.80) (0.73) (0.07) (0.10)
Change in profitability –2.32 –2.39 –2.85 –2.83 –1.08
(114.30) (0.01) (0.41) (0.90) (0.57)
Foreign revenue 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.34 0.16
(0.31) (1.31) (1.21) (***3.99) (1.67)
Number of operating segments 1.92 2.02 1.63 1.89 2.08
(1.29) (0.45) (0.72) (0.87) (1.14)
Market-to-book ratio 3.92 4.41 2.73 3.33 5.08
(4.66) (1.57) (**2.11) (0.94) (1.32)
Capital intensity 0.47 0.34 0.58 0.61 0.35
(1.19) (0.06) (0.97) (0.83) (0.12)
Corporate governance composite 2.53 2.21 2.54 2.70 2.76
(0.62) (***4.60) (0.19) (***2.45) (**2.64)
Number of analysts 9.60 11.46 6.40 14.34 4.16
(9.32) (***2.89) (**2.09) (***3.47) (***4.90)
Panel B
US 20-F listing 19 (11%) NA 4 (11%) 11 (23%) 4 (11%)
Big 4 auditor 155 (90%) 49 (94%) 33 (92%) 46 (98%) 27 (71%)
Negative EPS in 2003 44 (26%) 13 (25%) 16 (44%) 11 (23%) 4 (11%)
Chi-square statistic 0.50 **6.40 0.82 0.55
Descriptive statistics for continuous and dichotomous variables for the full sample and four countries. Size =
market value, 31 December 2003, US$ million. Change in leverage = (total debt/total equity 2003 – 2002)/
total debt/total equity 2002. Change in profitability = (ROE 2003 – 2002)/ABS ROE 2002. Foreign revenue
= proportion of foreign revenue to total revenue. Market-to-book = market value of equity at financial year-
end/book value of equity. Capital intensity = non-current assets/total assets. Corporate governance status =
score out of three, where 1 is added if board chair is a non-executive director, the majority of the board are
independent directors and the company uses a committee structure (audit, nomination and remuneration
committee). Analyst following = number of analysts following a company. Panel A shows means and
standard deviations are shown for the full sample and means and Mann Whitney Z statistics for each
country (for tests comparing mean ranks for each country and the other three). Panel B reports chi-square
statistics (which compare proportions in each country and the full sample) for negative EPS. Chi-square
tests are not conducted for US-20F listing and Big 4 auditor due to occurrence of cell sizes are below 5.
US 20-F listing, Big 4 auditor and Negative EPS are one if applicable to the company and zero 0 otherwise.
*** significant at p < 0.01. ** significant at p < 0.05. * significant at p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests).
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analysis as part of reform of company law (CLERP
9) (ASIC, 2005). The year 2003 was selected so that
reports predated the changes in the institutional
environment in the UK and Australia.7 We select
only one year for study due to the time consuming
nature of data collection, the need to collect
sufficient cases in each of the four countries and
the difficulty of controlling for the impact of
changes in the institutional framework over time
in four countries. A time series design would
introduce noise as the institutional settings changed,
making hypothesis testing more difficult.8
3.2. Coding procedure
The coding procedure involves two steps: (1)
independent identification of the attributional state-
ments (defined as a phrase or a sentence in which a
performance outcome is linked with a reason or a
cause for the outcome); and (2) independent coding
of the attributional statements according to the
characteristics of explained effects and explanatory
factors. The explained effects are coded according
to five characteristics: nature, valence, time orien-
tation, qualification and analytical level of
explained content. For each characteristic, different
elements are discriminated. The explanatory factors
(causes) are coded according to six characteristics:
explicitness of the antecedent–consequence rela-
tionship, direction of influence of the antecedent–
consequence relationship, time orientation and
qualification of the explanatory factor, nature of
the antecedent–consequence relationship and locus
of causality. As for explained effects, the charac-
teristics are classified according to different elem-
ents (see Appendix 2). The explanatory passages
selected must refer to the reporting entity or its
components.
In step 1 the reports were read by two
researchers independently (Coders 1 and 2). All
explanatory passages were marked and divided
into explained outcomes (or effects) and explana-
tory antecedent factors. The coders then compared
results and reached agreement on the coding.
Intercoder agreement on the initial identification
phase amounted to 91%.9 If coders were unable to
resolve a matter, one of the chief researchers was
the arbiter. In step 2, two other researchers (Coders
3 and 4) were responsible for coding the effects
and explanatory factors according to specific
content characteristics noted above. Coders 3 and
4 worked independently, compared results and
resolved any matters of disagreement by reference
to one of the chief researchers. Initial intercoder
agreement on the coded dimensions amounted to,
on average, 88%.10
As the study focuses on the relationship between
the annual financial statements and the narrative
sections of the annual report, we confine data
collection to attributional statements about
accounting performance outcomes (profit and loss
items such as income, expenses and earnings/
margins). There are several reasons to focus on
performance outcomes. Earnings and its compon-
ents are key metrics for the company and its
investors and are likely to give rise to explanatory
statements. In this regard, a recent survey of the
narrative reports of Fortune Global 500 companies
shows that the majority of the narratives relate to
explaining performance outcomes and this finding
was consistent over different jurisdictions (PwC,
2007).
Pilot testing of our content data confirmed that
the majority of statements in the management
commentary relate to performance explanations.
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7Managers in the UK and Australia could have anticipated
changes in narrative reporting requirements and changed the
content of their management commentary reports prior to
legislative change. If so, we would predict that increased
regulation and oversight would lead attribution statements to be
more like those of North American managers. Thus any bias
introduced by managers anticipating change favours not finding
country differences and therefore does not explain our results.
8 Although 2003 follows on from dramatic events in the USA
in 2001–2002 (the collapse of Enron, WorldCom and Arthur
Anderson and the terrorist attacks) we conjecture that, despite
these events, management commentary reports in 2003 are not
essentially different to those in immediate prior years. In both
the UK and Australia regulators concluded that the existing
regulatory framework was sound, implying that the environ-
ment in 2003 did not differ in particular ways from immediate
prior years. A 2001–2002 UK government review reported ‘no
serious flaw’ in the existing regulatory framework (DTI, 2004:
6). ASIC (2003: 47) stated there was ‘no material risk’ of Enron
type abuses. Even in the USA, 2003 does not seem to be a year
of radical change of MD&A content in relation to performance
outcomes. Nelson and Pritchard (2007), studying cautionary
language discussing risk factors and MD&A disclosure over the
period 1996–2003 show that the extent of these disclosures
steadily increases over the period. In 2001–2003, it is especially
the cautionary language content which increases relative to the
rest of the MD&A. They do not identify a breach of trend in
MD&A content in 2003.
9 Intercoder reliability was measured based on the coefficient
of agreement, which is the ratio of the number of pairwise
interjudge agreements to the total number of pairwise judgments
(Beattie et al., 2002: 20).
10 Robustness of data collection (Behn et al., 2001) was
assured in the following ways. First, step 1 data identification
was separated from step 2 classification to promote independ-
ence in analysis. Second, for 74 companies drawn from all
countries and industries (42% of the total sample), all the work
of the step 1 and step 2 coders was reviewed by the chief
researchers who read the management commentary reports,
checked that the identification of explained effects and
explanatory factors was complete and that the classification of
the content characteristics was correct. The process of double-
checking of 42% of the sample, review of all coding by the chief
researchers and the level of intercoder agreement provide
assurances as to the accuracy and completeness of coding.
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Moreover, the valence (favourable/unfavourable) of
explained profit and loss items is usually more
straightforward and less subjective than the tenor of,
for example, explained items of financial position
such as new financing, leverage or extent of capital
expenditure. Confining attributional disclosures to
explanations of profit and loss items generally
improves comparability and strengthens the reli-
ability of the coding process.
The following example illustrates an explained
effect (coded as Income/earnings/profit; Positive
effect; Present year; Quantitative; Segment of the
company; Implicit link) and its related explanatory
factors (coded as Same direction; Present year;
Qualitative; Causal explanation; Internal cause –
reference to management/board):
Effect statement
‘The segment result has increased by $41.1
million, or 66.3% to $103.8 million. After
adjusting for accounting policy changes the
segment result would have been $116.4 million
for 2003, representing an increase of $54.0
million or 86.5% for the year.’
Explanatory statement
‘ . . .Kmart’s (the segment) strong result was a
direct reflection of the strategy put in place last
year to move the Brand to the leadership position
in discount department store retailing.’
Coles Myer Annual Review 2003, p. 28
(Australia Retail)
3.3. Company-level aggregation and dependent
variables
As the company and not the specific instance of
attribution is treated as the unit of analysis, coding
results are aggregated at company level, after
meaningful selections on relevant attributional
categories at the individual attributional statement
level (as specified in Appendix 2). Appendix 1
explains key attributional concepts and describes
the company-level attributional properties used as
dependent variables and their measurement.11 The
company-level attributional variables are primarily
expressed as frequency and related difference
measures, although some were additionally trans-
formed into proportional measures, reflecting the
relative frequencies of specific attributional charac-
teristics. Additional coding examples are provided
in Appendix 3.
3.4. Empirical models
The following regression model is used to investi-
gate the determinants of attributional reporting:
Company-level attributional content variableit =
f (Company size, Diversification, Corporate
governance status, Negative earnings per
share, Growth, Analyst following, Capital inten-
sity, Change in leverage, Change in profitability,
Filing status,, Industry dummies, Country dum-
mies)it (1)
In order to isolate the country-level effect (the
country dummies in the regression model), we
control for company and industry variables that
proxy for the demand and supply of disclosure and
could therefore affect properties of attributional
statements. Data was obtained from the Datastream
database (which also provides access to I/B/E/S for
data on analyst following) and directly from
company annual reports (sourced from the
Mergent database and company websites).
Justification of control variables is outlined below.
Larger company size is commonly associated
with amount and quality of voluntary disclosure
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993). More specifically,
Baginski et al. (2004, 2008) show that the use of
causal explanations increases with company size.
Aerts (2005) evidences that larger companies use
more enhancements and entitlements, but less
defensive attributional statements. Company size
is measured as the natural logarithm of the
company’s market capitalisation (in USD).12
Company diversification will have an impact on
the complexity of the operations underlying the
accounting outcomes and on the supply of account-
ing outcomes eligible for attributional activity. Li
(2008) shows that the use of causal language in
MD&A is related to the number of reporting
segments. Aerts (2005) suggests that attributions
of segmental accounting outcomes complement or
substitute attributional arguments at corporate level,
depending on the tenor of the latter. We use the
number of business segments and the percentage of
foreign sales as proxies for diversification.
Corporate governance status proxies for moni-
toring mechanisms that are likely to affect discre-
tionary narrative disclosures. For example, it is
suggested that boards are more effective in moni-
toring company insiders when there is a strong base
of independent directors on the board (Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Xie et al., 2003). Dechow et al.
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12Multicollinearity between company size and analyst
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does, however, not qualitatively affect our results.
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(1996) show that companies with a large percentage
of non-executive directors are less likely to be
subject to enforcement actions by the SEC for
accounting policy violation. We proxy for corporate
governance status using a self-constructed compos-
ite measure (score out of three, where 1 is added if
board chair is a non-executive director, the majority
of the board are independent directors and the
company uses a committee structure, i.e. audit,
nomination and remuneration committees) based on
data disclosed in the annual reports. We select these
three indicators because they have been identified as
key aspects of a company’s governance structure
that influence external reporting behaviour
(Dechow et al., 1996; Dahya et al., 2002; Xie et
al., 2003).
Financial analysts are primary users of MD&A
and create a demand for incremental attributional
content (Clarkson et al., 1994; Schleicher et al.,
2007). Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Healy et al.
(1999) find a positive relation between analyst
following and the quality of a company’s disclo-
sure. Market premium (market-to-book ratio) is
used as a proxy for growth potential and investment
opportunity set. Growth companies may also have
more complex and uncertain business models,
increasing both the supply and demand for attribu-
tional disclosure. Li (2008) shows that the market-
to-book ratio is positively related to causal language
use in MD&A. Market-to-book is measured as
market value of equity at financial year-end divided
by book value of equity. In addition, we expect that
the level of capital investment intensity, a well-
known measure of entry barriers and proxy for
product market competition (Dye, 1985; Darrough
and Stoughton, 1990) to be associated with
attributional activity. Capital intensity may be an
important attribute for explaining changes in
accounting outcomes. It measured as total non-
current assets divided by total assets.
Company profitability and leverage can have both
a motivational and an informational impact on the
content of accounting narratives. From an informa-
tional perspective, level of and change in these
variables proxy for good versus bad news and
directly affect the supply of information to be
explained. As well, level and change in profitability
may provide strong incentives for impression man-
agement and trigger qualitatively different attribu-
tional statements (Aerts, 2001, 2005; Clatworthy
and Jones, 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2003). We include
proxies to control for level and change in profitabil-
ity (relative change in return on equity and a
negative EPS dummy) and change in leverage
(relative change total debt over total equity).
Prior research has shown that cross-listing
increases the level and quality of disclosure,
especially if a company is cross-listed on a foreign
market that is more regulated than the domestic
market. Therefore we expect that SEC foreign
registrants will experience disclosure pressures
(including attributional disclosure demands) similar
to those of US companies. We use a dummy for a
Form 20-F filing by a non-US company. Finally, we
include dummy variables (for four of the five
industry groups) because industry membership has
been shown to influence voluntary disclosure
(McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Malone et al.,
1993; Meek et al., 1995) and industry-specific
features may lead to distinctive disclosure patterns,
including specific attributional disclosures (Aerts,
2005).
Including analyst following in our model creates
a potential problem of endogeneity with regard to
disclosure properties (Tong, 2007; Hope, 2003).
Both may be affected by a common disclosure
strategy. Financial analysts are more likely to follow
companies with more informative disclosures,
while, on the other hand, companies may disclose
more in order to attract more financial analysts. In
that vein, narrative disclosure properties and analyst
following may be simultaneously determined. If
companies manage their explanatory reporting with
the benefits of more analyst following in mind, the
assumption of no interdependence is violated,
which leads to unreliable OLS-statistics.
Endogeneity between explanatory reporting and
analyst following leads us to use a 2SLS approach
for the above regression with analyst following
estimated according to the following model (while
dropping company size in the attributional content
regression due to multicollinearity):
Analyst followingit = f(20F filing, Company size,
Market-to-book ratio, Return variability,
Industry, Country)it (2)
The rationale for the relationship of analyst
following and explanatory variables is as follows. A
Form 20-F filing by non-US companies may create
greater demand for analysts’ services (Lang et al.,
2003). A US listing is likely to stimulate activity by
analysts in the foreign country, adding to the
domestic supply of analysts’ services. From the
supply side, analysts may be more inclined to
follow cross-listed companies since they are more
likely to attract a larger investor base.
Bhushan (1989) argues that company size affects
both the aggregate demand and the aggregate
supply for analysts’ services. Demand is positively
affected by company size because the aggregate
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/11/2010 03 ABR Aerts.3d Page 433 of 450
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potential payoff for shareholders from access to
higher quality information is more important for
larger companies. Supply is positively affected,
because there are significant fixed costs in following
a company and the payoff from following is related
to its size. Analyst coverage has been shown to be
related to Tobin’s Q (Lang et al., 2003). The demand
for analyst services will generally be higher in high-
intangible asset companies, where the informative-
ness of financial reports is relatively lower (Amir et
al., 2003; Barth et al., 2001). Prior research
documents a relation between earnings volatility
and analyst coverage (e.g. Bhushan, 1989; Lang et
al., 2003), suggesting that demand for analysts’
services is higher for companies with higher
financial risk. We measure return variability as the
standard deviation of the return on assets during the
prior five fiscal years divided by the mean.
Industries are not likely to equally attract financial
analysts, so dummy variables are used to control for
industry effects. Chang et al. (2000) provide
evidence that country-level institutional variables
affect the availability of analyst forecasts. Hence,
we introduce country dummies to control for any
country effect.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the
attributional content variables (in total and by
country). The average number of attributional
statements is 33.46, relative to an average of
16.19 explained outcomes, i.e. on average, each
attributed outcome is accompanied by 2.04 explan-
ations.13 There are more positively evaluated out-
comes than negatively evaluated ones (9.50
positives versus 6.52 negatives). Prospective out-
comes represent, on average, 12.31% of the
explained effects, an average of 1.73 prospective
attributions per management commentary.14
Nearly 61% of the explained outcomes relate to
company level information with the balance cover-
ing outcomes on a segment level (business or
geographical segments, divisions, legal entities,
product lines – 39.10%). More than one-third of the
explanatory statements can be qualified as inter-
mediary explanations (technical-accounting
explanations) (38.37%) and these are biased
towards the framing of negative accounting out-
comes, a tendency referred to as ‘informality bias on
positives’ (see Appendix 1).
As to the self-serving characteristics of the
attributional statements, a majority of the explan-
ations relate to positively perceived accounting
outcomes, but this self-promotional effect is not
overwhelming (55.95% of the explained effects are
evaluated as positive). The moderate character of
the overall positiveness factor may reflect the fact
that only explanations of performance were coded.
By ignoring explanations of company actions and
decisions not expressed in profit and loss termin-
ology, managerial discretion in selecting and com-
menting on facts with positive ramifications is only
partially captured in our data set.
Self-serving tendencies become more apparent in
the causal assertiveness bias (i.e. number of positive
outcomes explained with reference to internal
causes minus number of positive outcomes
explained with reference to external causes). The
average value of 4.95 indicates a strong acclaiming
bias, but a comparable causal defensiveness bias
(i.e. number of negative outcomes explained with
reference to external causes minus number of
negative outcomes explained with reference to
internal causes) does not hold for the full sample.
The country differences in attributional behav-
iour as shown in Table 4 are broadly consistent with
our hypotheses. We support this assertion by
comparing the USA and the UK on the key
attributional metrics. Depth of explanations and
density of explanations (H1 cognitive effort) are
both higher in the USA relative to the UK. As to H2
(inconsistency in explanatory format of positive
versus negative content), valence inconsistency in
formality of explanations is considerably higher in
the UK than in the USA, but this observation does
not extend to valence inconsistency in depth of
explanations.15 Consistent with H3 (formality of
explanations), we observe that US companies use
considerably more formal language explanations
than UK companies and this seems to be driven
mainly by not avoiding formal, intermediary
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/11/2010 03 ABR Aerts.3d Page 434 of 450
13We are unable to compare the average number of
attributional statements in our study to that in prior studies
because the average number depends heavily on the coding
procedures used. Coding dimensions affecting the number of
attributional statements are: section of the annual report coded
(chairman’s statement versus MD&A), types of outcome
included (accounting outcomes only versus all types of
corporate outcomes), types of argument included (only causal
explanations or including technical-accounting explanations).
14 This is consistent with a subsequent MD&A survey which
shows that about 10% of quantified narrative reporting relates to
forward-looking information (PwC, 2007).
15 Note that for the two measures of inconsistency in
explanatory format, the number of observations is reduced to
158 as the valence inconsistency concept refers to a bias in the
way positive versus negative outcomes are processed. As it is
based on a comparison of the explanatory treatment of outcomes
relative to their valence (or evaluative content), the variables
require the presence of at least one positive and one negative
explained performance outcome in the management commen-
tary (see also Appendix 1).
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Table 4
Attributional content descriptive statistics
Explanatory content characteristics
at company-level
Total
N = 172
USA
N = 51
CAN
N = 36
UK
N = 47
AUS
N = 38
Mean
(Std dev.)
Mean
(Std dev.)
Mean
(Std dev.)
Mean
(Std dev.)
Mean
(Std dev.)
Amount of explanations
Number of explained outcomes 16.19
(11.48)
16.64
(7.99)
13.74
(9.12)
22.60
(14.95)
9.89
(8.36)
Number of positive outcomes 9.50
(7.93)
9.42
(5.86)
6.37
(5.29)
14.02
(10.35)
6.92
(6.55)
Number of negative outcomes 6.52
(5.22)
7.21
(3.67)
7.14
(5.71)
8.36
(6.46)
2.71
(2.40)
Number of neutral outcomes 0.17
(0.56)
0.02
(0.50)
0.23
(0.49)
0.21
(0.66)
0.26
(0.55)
Number of prospective outcomes 1.73
(2.04)
1.72
(2.04)
1.17
(2.43)
1.94
(1.86)
1.50
(1.90)
Number of explanations
Number of formal explanations
33.46
(24.23)
12.83
(11.85)
39.08
(21.08)
18.47
(12.96)
28.14
(21.50)
11.89
(11.77)
42.11
(28.128)
13.94
(11.26)
19.84
(18.39)
5.67
(7.48)
Explanatory effort (H1)
Depth of explanations 2.04
(0.60)
2.33
(0.52)
2.01
(0.67)
1.88
(0.38)
1.88
(0.73)
Density of explanations 1.25
(0.73)
1.55
(0.71)
1.10
(0.61)
1.38
(0.75)
0.83
(0.62)
Inconsistency in explanatory format for positive
versus negative content (H2)
Valence inconsistency in depth of explanations
(N = 158)
0.58
(0.66)
0.54
(0.48)
0.61
(0.56)
0.50
(0.72)
0.78
(0.88)
Valence inconsistency in formality of explanations
(N = 158)
13.15
(11.77)
11.39
(9.46)
9.29
(8.36)
17.64
(14.40)
13.10
(12.07)
Formality of explanations (H3)
Technical-accounting explanations (%) 38.37
(23.81)
47.28
(19.67)
42.56
(20.76)
33.11
(20.61)
28.58
(30.06)
Informality bias on positives 6.38
(11.19)
2.87
(10.46)
2.00
(6.44)
11.28
(13.06)
9.24
(10.17)
Self-serving causal explanations (H4)
Assertive causal bias on positives 4.95
(6.24)
3.92
(5.35)
3.34
(4.10)
8.17
(7.29)
3.89
(6.41)
Use of enhancements and entitlements (%) 24.09
(17.53)
18.81
(13.46)
19.67
(19.78)
27.43
(14.94)
31.40
(20.22)
Defensive causal bias on negatives –0.94
(4.23)
–2.26
(3.72)
–1.43
(4.40)
0.51
(5.31)
–0.42
(2.25)
Use of excuses, justifications and causality
denials (%)
6.95
(8.57)
6.08
(6.87)
6.67
(7.05)
8.96
(9.35)
5.90
(10.66)
This table reports mean scores (standard deviation) in total and by country for attribution content variables.
Terminology legend of explanatory content characteristics is presented in Appendix 1.
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explanations when explaining positive outcomes
(‘informality bias on positives’). In line with H4
(self-serving causal explanations), all variables for
self-serving tendencies in causal explanation are
higher for UK companies relative to US companies.
The UK companies use relatively more defensive
attributional tactics (‘excuses’, ‘justifications’ and
‘causality denials’) and assertive attributional tactics
(‘enhancements’ and ‘entitlements’) than US com-
panies and exhibit a definite causal bias on both
positive and negative outcomes. The descriptive
country differences provide indicative support for
our hypotheses, which we formally test using
multivariate regression analysis.
4.2. Multivariate analyses
Since a company’s information dynamics may well
affect narrative disclosure and financial analyst
following simultaneously, we first assess whether
endogeneity exists between these variables using a
Hausman test. Using this procedure, results (not-
tabulated) reject the null hypothesis of no endo-
geneity with respect to analyst following and
density of explanations, formality inconsistency
and the four self-presentational content properties
(assertive causal bias; use of entitlements and
enhancements; defensive causal bias; use of
excuses, justifications and causality denials). The
tests did not reject the null hypothesis with regard to
the other dependent variables. Given these results,
we employ two stage least squares (2SLS) with size
omitted in the second stage.16,17
4.2.1. Explanatory effort
In order to test our first hypothesis on explanatory
effort (H1), we regress ‘density of explanations’
(Model 1) and ‘depth of explanations’ (Model 2) on
the variables documented in our empirical models
including analyst following (Table 5). Results from
Models 1 and 2 (Panel A) indicate that the tendency
to provide explanations for financial performance
outcomes together with the number of explanations
offered for each performance outcome is signifi-
cantly lower in Australia, the UK and Canada than
in the USA (the omitted country dummy).
Moreover, OLS results (not reported in detail)
show that adding the country dummies in a second
step significantly increases model fit. Overall, the
country variables enhance the regression model’s
explanatory power with an incremental R-square of
.067 (p < 0.01). Alternating the omitted country
dummies (Models 1 and 2, Panel B) shows no
additional differences between the UK and
Australia and marginally less explanatory effort
between these two countries and Canada.
Combining US and Canadian companies in a
North America dummy variable (Models 1 and 2,
Panel C) generally confirms the broad institutional
differences, although the adjusted R-square
declines, confirming the relevance of finer-grained
country differences. Overall, these results are
consistent with H1.
Interestingly, the absolute amount of explanatory
reasoning is not associated with the country dum-
mies. Results of regression models on absolute
amount of explanatory reasoning (absolute number
of explained outcomes and absolute number of
explanatory statements) (not tabulated) indicate the
absence of significant country effects on absolute
amount of attributional search, but shows a very
strong and positive effect of analyst following on
amount of explanatory reasoning. With density of
explanations and depth of explanations being
strongly country-dependent, it suggests that H1
mainly works for relative cognitive effort rather
than absolute level.
4.2.2. Inconsistency in explanatory format for
positive versus negative content
H2 proposes that higher expected litigation and
regulatory costs will lead to less inconsistency in the
way positive versus negative outcomes are evalu-
ated. Valence inconsistency in formality of explan-
ations proxies for explanatory inconsistency in the
sense that there may be a tendency to use technical-
accounting explanations more for negative per-
formance outcomes than for positive outcomes.
Valence inconsistency in depth of explanations
would indicate explanatory inconsistency in the
sense that the number of explanations used for each
explained outcome would differ between positive
and negative performance outcomes. Table 5
reports results for the regression models of both
valence inconsistency proxies. Results from
Model 3 (Panel A) indicate that Australian and
UK companies tend to be significantly less consist-
ent in their use of formal explanations relative to
their US counterparts. No differences can be
established for Canadian companies that also do
not seem to significantly differ on the valence
inconsistency property relative to their counterparts
in the UK and Australia (Table 5, Panel B). Results
from Model 4 (Panel A and B) show no significant
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/11/2010 03 ABR Aerts.3d Page 436 of 450
16 The results relating to the country variables are not
materially different when OLS regression techniques are used.
17 In 2SLS regressions, all exogenous variables are used as
instruments. In the case that regressions and error terms are not
related, i.e. absence of endogeneity, 2SLS will produce the same
estimates as OLS. Therefore, if any of the endogeneously
specified variables are in fact exogeneous, the 2SLS is still
appropriate (Judge et al., 1988: 655).
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Table 5
2SLS regressions – determinants of explanatory effort, inconsistency in explanatory format and
formality of explanations
N = 172
Model 1
Density of
explanations
Model 2
Depth of
explanations
Model 3
Valence
inconsistency
in formality
(N=158)
Model 4
Valence
inconsistency
in depth
(N=158)
Model 5
Technical-
accounting
explanations
(%)
Model 6
Informality
bias on
positives
Panel A – Initial model
Constant ***1.349 ***2.359 –2.657 ***0.923 ***0.447 –4.983
Listing 20F 0.017 0.187 **–7.789 0.328 0.056 ***–7.698
Change in leverage –0.014 –0.017 –0.139 0.007 0.005 –0.084
Change in
profitability
0.050 **0.095 0.707 **0.139 **–0.037 0.564
Negative EPS –0.010 –0.151 –3.625 –0.128 0.087 –3.279
I/ Building materials 0.335 **0.332 3.615 0.072 –0.046 **6.065
I/ Pharmaceuticals **–0.351 –0.074 *4.845 0.256 **–0.144 ***7.718
I/ Biotechnology –0.292 –0.016 4.957 –0.005 *–0.149 *5.673
I/ Food processors –0.014 *0.224 1.716 0.099 –0.086 2.333
Foreign revenue 0.099 –0.117 3.233 0.036 –0.049 3.776
Number of segments 0.058 –0.018 **1.779 –0.053 –0.006 **1.596
Market-to-book **–0.029 –0.010 **–0.498 –0.002 **0.009 *–0.381
Capital intensity –0.022 –0.025 –0.272 0.033 –0.014 –0.617
Corporate governance
status
0.015 0.042 0.902 –0.090 *0.045 –1.211
Analyst following **0.027 –0.010 ***0.694 –0.014 –0.003 ***0.487
Australia ***–0.533 ***–0.545 **5.339 0.236 ***–0.251 ***11.144
UK **–0.314 ***–0.544 **5.040 –0.027 ***–0.144 ***8.498
Canada **–0.282 ***–0.363 2.295 0.012 –0.058 2.429
Adj. R-square 0.253 0.167 0.207 0.046 0.102 0.238
Incremental R-square
(country variables)
***0.067 ***.119 **.027 0.016 ***.115 ***0.115
Panel B – Alternating country dummies
UK as the omitted country dummy:
Australia –0.219 –0.001 0.299 0.263 *–0.107 2.646
Canada 0.032 *0.181 –2.745 0.040 *0.086 ***–6.068
USA **0.314 ***0.544 **–5.040 0.027 ***0.144 ***–8.498
Canada as the omitted country dummy:
Australia *–0.251 *–0.182 3.043 0.224 ***–0.193 ***8.715
UK –0.032 *–0.181 2.745 –0.040 *–0.086 ***6.068
USA **0.282 ***0.363 –2.295 –0.012 0.058 –2.429
Panel C – Regression models with dummy variable for North America (USA and Canada)
North America ***0.272 ***0.370 **–4.067 –0.068 ***0.162 ***–8.467
Adj. R-square 0.213 0.124 0.224 0.043 0.096 0.259
Results for 2SLS regression equations examining the association between company-level attributional
properties and company attributes. In Panel A the USA is omitted country dummy variable and retail is the
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country differences for valence inconsistency in
depth of explanations. Overall, these results provide
only some weak support for H2. Inconsistency in
the use of technical-accounting explanations is
strongly associated with analyst following and is
negatively affected by being a US foreign registrant,
the latter being in line with the strong polarisation of
US companies on this property. The lack of
significant associations for valence inconsistency
in depth of explanations may indicate that the
tendency to offer more explanations for a positive
versus a negative performance outcome is not
associated with the company’s information envir-
onment, but reflects a more general cognitive
tendency.
4.2.3. Formality of explanations
H3 predicts higher use of formal language explan-
ations (technical-accounting explanations) in an
environment with higher expected regulatory and
litigation costs. Model 5 (Table 5, Panel A)
evidences significantly higher relative use of formal
language explanations in the USA than in Australia
and the UK. Model 6 (Table 5, Panel A) (‘infor-
mality bias on positives’) suggests that this differ-
ence is driven by the fact that US companies show a
lower tendency to avoid formal language when
positive outcomes are explained than their
Australian and UK counterparts. Table 5 (Panels
A, B and C) documents that Canadian companies
are very near to US companies in this respect, while
UK companies and Australian companies also tend
to behave similarly with regard to the formality of
their explanations.
4.2.4. Self-serving causal explanations
H4 predicts that in an institutional setting with
higher expected regulatory and litigation costs
companies exhibit less self-serving tendencies in
financial performance explanations. Table 6 shows
two models for the assertive side of self-serving
behaviour (Models 7 and 8) and two models for the
defensive component of self-serving behaviour
(Models 9 and 10). Taking the four models together,
a consistent country pattern emerges. Consistent
with expectations, Australian and UK companies
are significantly more self-serving in their causal
explanations than US companies. Differences
among Australian and UK companies (Table 6,
Panel B) are not significant. Based on the regression
coefficients of the country dummies (Table 6,
Panels A and B) Canadian companies occupy a
somewhat middle position between US companies
on one hand and Australian and UK companies on
the other, although not all regression coefficients
point to significant differences. Moreover, incre-
mental R-square statistics show that adding the
country dummies in a second step significantly
increases model fit for the four models. Regrouping
US and Canadian companies in a North America
dummy variable (Table 6, Panel C) is consistent
with the former country differences, but increases
model fit only for Model 8 (Use of entitlements and
enhancements). Results are consistent for both
assertiveness in explaining positive outcomes and
defensiveness in explaining negative outcomes.
Analyst following brings companies to report more
self-servingly. In line with the country effect, a
Form 20-F filing is associated with non-US com-
panies explaining accounting outcomes less assert-
ively and less defensively.
Overall, analyst following seems to have a
significant impact on explanatory behaviour.
Whereas more intense analyst following seems to
provide a strong incentive to explain more per-
formance outcomes, it does not bring companies to
explain more in a consistent and formal way. In fact,
higher analyst following brings companies to
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Table 5
2SLS regressions – determinants of explanatory effort, inconsistency in explanatory format and
formality of explanations (continued)
omitted industry dummy variable. Listing 20F = 1 if the company has a US listing requiring a Form 20-F
reconciliation (0 otherwise). Change in leverage = (total debt/total equity 2003 – 2002)/ total debt/total
equity 2002. Change in profitability = (ROE 2003 – 2002)/ABS ROE 2002. Negative EPS = 1 if company
reports a negative EPS (0 otherwise). Foreign revenue = proportion of foreign revenue to total revenue.
Market-to-book = market value of equity at financial year-end/book value of equity. Capital intensity = non-
current assets/total assets. Corporate governance status = score out of three, where 1 is added if board chair
is a non-executive director, the majority of the board are independent directors and the company uses a
committee structure (audit, nomination and remuneration committee). Analyst following = number of
analysts following a company. Panel B reports coefficients and significance levels for country dummy
variables when they are rotated and the UK and Canada are, respectively, the omitted dummy variables.
Panel C reports coefficients and significance levels when countries are grouped into USA/Canada and UK/
Australia and the latter is the omitted dummy variable. *** significant at p < 0.01. ** significant at
p < 0.05. * significant at p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests. one-tailed for country variables).
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Table 6
2SLS regressions – determinants of self-serving attributional tendencies
N = 172
Model 7
Assertive
causal bias
Model 8
Use of
entitlements
and
enhancements
Model 9
Defensive
causal bias
Model 10
Use of excuses,
justifications and
causality denials
Panel A – Initial model
Constant 2.572 1.053 ***–4.964 *–4.482
Listing 20F ***–4.721 ***–5.411 **–2.729 **–1.561
Change in leverage –0.049 –0.068 0.076 –0.040
Change in profitability 0.293 0.301 **–0.654 –0.261
Negative EPS –1.913 *–3.064 *–1.688 –0.930
I/ Building materials **–3.628 2.238 **2.202 **1.509
I/ Pharmaceuticals 1.103 2.346 –0.256 *1.215
I/ Biotechnology 1.289 3.545 0.242 1.277
I/ Food processors 0.562 **3.921 **1.724 ***2.236
Foreign revenue 0.525 1.274 *1.963 **1.432
Number of segments ***1.046 ***1.438 0.369 **0.373
Market-to-book **–0.217 **–0.309 0.072 –0.004
Capital intensity –0.501 –0.565 *0.422 **0.374
Corporate governance status *–1.034 –1.224 0.324 0.309
Analyst following ***0.257 *0.022 *0.022 *0.042
Australia **3.458 **4.679 **1.664 **1.427
UK ***4.994 ***4.321 ***2.711 ***2.101
Canada 1.749 1.063 **1.669 0.725
Adj. R-square 0.237 0.323 0.226 0.317
Incremental R-square (OLS – on country
variables)
***.079 **.047 ***0.047 **.028
Panel B – Alternating country dummies
UK as the omitted country dummy:
Australia –1.536 0.358 –1.050 –0.586
Canada **–3.245 **–3.257 –1.041 **–1.309
USA ***–4.994 ***–4.321 ***–2.711 ***–2.101
Canada as the omitted country dummy:
Australia 1.710 **3.616 –0.008 0.880
UK **3.245 **3.257 1.041 **1.309
USA –1.749 –1.063 **–1.669 –0.725
Panel C – Regression models with dummy variable for North America (USA and Canada)
North America ***–3.494 ***–3.964 **–1.457 **–1.485
Adj. R-square 0.233 0.341 0.202 0.296
Results for 2SLS regression equations examining the association between company-level attributional
properties and company attributes. In Panel A the USA is omitted country dummy variable and retail is the
omitted industry dummy variable. Listing 20F = 1 if the company has a US listing requiring a Form 20-F
reconciliation (0 otherwise). Change in leverage = (total debt/total equity 2003 – 2002)/ total debt/total
equity 2002. Change in profitability = (ROE 2003 – 2002)/ABS ROE 2002. Negative EPS = 1 if company
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explain more and do so in a more self-presentational
fashion. For example, companies followed by more
analysts typically avoid technical-accounting
explanations when they have the opportunity to
self-servingly claim positive outcomes and tend to
use tactical causal disclosures in a somewhat biased
way. In that, analyst following affects explanatory
behaviour in a similar way as expected regulatory
and litigation costs with regard to cognitive effort,
but in an opposite way with regard to self-serving
behaviour.
5. Conclusion
We examine the extent to which a country’s
institutional environment affects listed companies’
explanations of financial performance in narrative
reports contained in their annual reports. Although
there are many institutional and economic similar-
ities among the four countries included in this study
(the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia), our
results suggest that differences in institutional
environment and associated regulatory and litiga-
tion risks significantly affect the attributional prop-
erties of explanatory statements in a company’s
management commentary. Country differences
relate to intensity of argument, presentational
tendencies, preferences for formal language use
and relative importance of tactical causal shading of
explained outcomes through the use of entitlements,
enhancements, excuses, justifications and causality
denials. Consistent with behavioural accountability
theory predictions, we find that the institutional
setting of North American companies promotes
extensive use of formal technical-accounting lan-
guage in a consistent manner and significantly
restrains the extent of self-serving tendencies in the
explanations offered.
In this study, management commentary is por-
trayed as an accountability mechanism and its
presentational content as a relational feature,
reflecting narrative coping behaviour according to
the nature and the extent of accountability pressures
arising from a company’s institutional environment.
In that regard, we contend that presentational
features of financial performance commentary can
best be understood when placed in the context of
relationships among entities embedded in the
relevant social and institutional environment.
Situational factors will affect the relative salience
of rewards or sanctions and this will shape coping
responses to accountability pressures. In a voluntary
reporting regime with low legal scrutiny, potential
informational rewards will be more salient, whereas
in a mandatory, high-scrutiny context potential
sanctions can be expected to become dominant,
bringing companies to fall back on risk-avoiding
verbal behaviour.
The higher expected regulatory and litigation
costs embedded in the North American institutional
environment seems to put significant constraints on
the self-serving content of narratives: both causal
defensiveness and causal assertiveness are signifi-
cantly lower for North American firms, and espe-
cially for US firms. The threat of regulatory scrutiny
and of disclosure-related litigation, could explain
this modesty in self-presentational behaviour. This
is consistent with Rogers et al. (2009) who suggest
US firms can reduce litigation risk by decreasing the
use of optimistic language in earnings announce-
ments. One should also keep in mind that annual
financial statements function in a long-term bench-
marking mode. Previous explanations serve as
reference points for follow-up disclosures. The
risk of contradiction brings management to refrain
from overtly biased self-serving verbal behaviour
and this effect is probably stronger in jurisdictions
where more intense monitoring of narrative reports
and disclosure carries greater litigation risk.
The tendency to use formal language explan-
ations intensively is especially noticeable for US
companies: on average 47.28% of the performance
explanations of US companies are framed as
intermediary, technical-accounting explanations
versus only 28.58% for Australian companies at
the lower end of the sample range. These results
suggest that in a high scrutiny environment,
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/11/2010 03 ABR Aerts.3d Page 440 of 450
Table 6
2SLS regressions – determinants of self-serving attributional tendencies (continued)
reports a negative EPS (0 otherwise). Foreign revenue = proportion of foreign revenue to total revenue.
Market-to-book = market value of equity at financial year-end/book value of equity. Capital intensity = non-
current assets/total assets. Corporate governance status = score out of three, where 1 is added if board chair
is a non-executive director, the majority of the board are independent directors and the company uses a
committee structure (audit, nomination and remuneration committee). Analyst following = number of
analysts following a company. Panel B reports coefficients and significance levels for country dummy
variables when they are rotated and the UK and Canada are, respectively, the omitted dummy variables.
Panel C reports coefficients and significance levels when countries are grouped into USA/Canada and UK/
Australia and the latter is the omitted dummy variable. *** significant at p < 0.01. ** significant at
p < 0.05. * significant at p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests, one-tailed for country variables).
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explanatory patterns may, to a large extent, be the
outcome of a ritualised disclosure process and
imply routinised discourse explanations in terms of
generally accepted or taken-for-granted antecedent-
consequence relationships. Such a formal and
ritualistic narrative disclosure stance is consistent
with the vast literature on social facilitation pub-
lished since Zajonc’s (1965) classic paper, which
suggests that cognitive overload and scrutiny pres-
sures caused by the presence of an evaluative
audience will facilitate dominant, well-rehearsed,
but more rigid responses and will inhibit more
descriptive types of analysis which are more
responsive to changing circumstances. The conjec-
ture that higher scrutiny pressures are likely to lead
to a low-risk attitude in explanatory behaviour, and
may inhibit extensive causal analysis, could nega-
tively affect the information value of resulting
explanations.
Our findings extend prior literature about attribu-
tional statements and disclosure in management
commentary reports in several ways. We provide a
cross-country study, which is useful given the
internationalisation of accounting standards and
financial reporting. Following adoption of
International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) in Europe and elsewhere in 2005, there
has been considerable attention given to the inter-
national comparability of financial reporting and the
possible impact of country differences on financial
statements. We provide evidence about the impact
of institutional setting on narrative reporting in four
countries which are actively involved in harmon-
isation of international accounting standard-setting
and regulation. The evidence shows that institu-
tional environment matters and, consistent with
arguments presented by Schipper (2005) and Ball
(2006), suggests that the setting in which reporting
occurs may well be an important factor in explain-
ing the extent to which goals of comparable
financial reporting can be achieved.
In relation to attributional statements, we extend
the literature since most prior studies are in a single-
country setting. We present a methodology for
comparing explanatory content of narrative reports
between companies from different countries and we
show identifiable country differences in properties
of attributional statements. Future research may
compare attributional statements in other countries
over time, extending our understanding of how
institutional setting and changes in setting affect
explanatory content in companies’ management
commentary reports.
In relation to disclosure and institutional setting,
we extend the literature by focusing on explanatory
content in narrative reports. Other studies of the
effect of regulatory setting and litigation risk have
focused on disclosure in earnings forecasts and
announcements, and in conference calls. Our study
adds to this area of research by showing how
disclosure in management commentary is affected
by regulatory setting. There are few cross-country
studies of narrative reporting and none which
systematically compare performance explanations
in a relatively large sample of companies from
several industries. In our study we relate differ-
ences in institutional setting to differences in
private and public enforcement properties. We
argue that the presence of a mandatory or a
voluntary narrative reporting regime is mainly
endogenous to the wider institutional setting cap-
tured by the notion of expected regulatory and
litigation costs. Although the availability of explicit
rules of compliance with regard to MD&A report-
ing in North America definitely affects expected
regulatory and litigation costs, our study does not
allow us to make specific inferences with regard to
the effect of mandatory rules on management
commentary. On the one hand, the mandatory rules
are not specific as to how explanations of account-
ing outcomes are to be constructed, whereas, on the
other hand, the observed differences between US
and Canadian companies show that within a
mandatory MD&A reporting system, other institu-
tional factors matter.
The important role of management commentary
in communicating between companies and their
investors is widely acknowledged (IASB, 2005).
However, many deficiencies and weaknesses have
been identified in the information provided and
questions raised about how usefulness of the
information is affected by the setting in which it is
prepared. The International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB, 2005) notes that there is little research
about the effectiveness of different approaches to
regulating management commentary reports. Our
study provides evidence that is relevant to standard-
setters such as the IASB and regulators such as the
International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) as they consider the best
way to promote useful narrative disclosure. Since
we show that regulatory setting and potential
litigation risk do impact on the way performance
explanations are framed, our evidence is relevant to
considerations of whether investors are best served
by mandatory reports and active monitoring by
market regulators. Causal explanations, even of an
explicit self-serving nature, have been shown to
reveal useful information (Baginski et al., 2004,
2008) and markets may not be served by making
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/11/2010 03 ABR Aerts.3d Page 441 of 450
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companies avoid such arguments. In this regard, it
could be argued that a country’s institutional
environment should not be too threatening so as
to inhibit an explicit causal stance by corporate
management. Future research in this area could
investigate the extent to which the differences we
find in attributional framing have economic conse-
quences for financial information users.
Our study is subject to limitations common in
research about narrative reporting. Key data have
been hand collected, giving rise to two concerns.
First, only a limited sample of companies and
countries can be included due to the labour-
intensive and time-consuming nature of data col-
lection. We considered only companies from four
countries, five industries and reports for one year.
This may affect the generalisability of results to
other companies, industries and time periods.
Second, the extensive manual coding of narrative
material involves individual views and interpret-
ations. Although several controls were exercised
over data collection to improve the reliability of the
results, it is still possible that some variables have
been measured with error.
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Appendix 1
Explanation of terms – attributional content characteristics and dependent variables
Attributional statement Antecedent – consequence statement. One or more sentences (or part
thereof) in which an outcome or effect (relating to company’s financial
performance, i.e. revenue, expense or net income/earnings/profits item) is
linked to one or more antecedents for that outcome, e.g. sales increased due
to strong consumer demand and an increase in retail outlets.
Explained outcomes
Company/segment The explained outcome relates to the company as a whole and/or to a
segment of the company, e.g. sales for the company decreased in the current
year (company). However, there was strong performance of the Orange
division, following restructuring carried out last year (segment).
Valence of effect A positive effect is favourable for the company (e.g. revenue increasing,
expenses decreasing). A negative effect is not favourable (e.g. expenses have
increased, without a commensurate increase in revenue).
Prospective statement The attributional statement relates to a future outcome, e.g. sales are
expected to increase in the following year due to improved economic
conditions including lower interest rates.
Explanatory effort (H1)
Depth of explanations* Number of explanations for each statement of effect (may be one or more).
e.g. sales increased due to strong consumer demand and an increase in retail
outlets (one outcome, two antecedents).
Density of
explanations*
Number of a company’s attribution statements relative to number of items of
disclosure about results of operations in MD&A, OFR or equivalent.
Inconsistency in explanatory format for positive versus negative content (H2)
Valence inconsistency
in formality of
explanations*
Relative use of accounting-technical explanations (intermediary accounts)
for positive versus negative effects, measured as the number of intermediary
explanations of negative outcomes minus the number of intermediary
explanations of positive outcomes, given the presence of both positive and
negative explained outcomes.
Valence inconsistency
in depth of
explanations*
Number of explanations per effect for positive versus negative effects,
measured as the average number of explanations for each positive outcome
minus the average number of explanations for each negative outcome, given
the presence of both positive and negative explained outcomes.
Formality (H3)
Technical-accounting
versus causal
explanation
Technical-accounting explanations are based on technical-accounting
language and are of an intermediary nature (e.g. profit increased because
margins improved). Causal explanations refer to other types of explanation
(e.g. sales revenue increased due to stronger demand and a more buoyant
economy).
Technical-accounting
explanations (%)*
Relative use of intermediary (technical-accounting) explanations, measured
as the % of intermediary explanations on total number of attributional
statements.
Informality bias on
positives*
(Relative) tendency to explain positive outcomes more in explicitly causal
terms than in technical-accounting language, measured as number of positive
outcomes explained causally minus number of positive outcomes explained
through intermediary accounts.
Self-serving tendencies (H4)
Assertive causal bias* (Relative) tendency to explain positive outcomes more from internal than
external causal antecedents, measured as number of positive outcomes
explained by internal causal factors minus number of positive outcomes
explained through external causal factors.
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Appendix 1 continued
Defensive causal bias* (Relative) tendency to explain negative outcomes more from external than
internal causal antecedents, measured as number of negative outcomes
explained by external causal factors minus number of negative outcomes
explained through internal causal factors.
Enhancement The framing of a positive outcome relative to a negative external causal
factor, e.g. the company achieved strong revenue growth in the Orange
division, despite an industry-wide decline in demand for goods produced.
Entitlement A positive outcome is attributed to an internal causal factor
(e.g. management decision) rather than to an external causal factor
(e.g. industry or economy-wide factors).
Use of enhancements
and entitlements (%)*
Use of entitlements and enhancements is measured as the % of the sum of
enhancements and entitlements on total number of attributional statements.
Excuse A negative outcome is attributed to an external causal factor (e.g. industry or
economy-wide factors) rather than to an internal causal factor
(e.g. management decision). For example, sales declined in the period,
largely due to poor demand reflecting an unexpected downturn in the
economic cycle.
Justification A negative outcome is rationalised by pointing to a goal or purpose (reason-
type of explanations), e.g. R&D expenses increased in order to accelerate the
introduction of new high-quality products.
Causality denial The framing of a negative outcome relative to a positive internal causal
factor (implicit denial of responsibility for a negative outcome by referring
to internal proactive or remedial factors), e.g. despite increased efforts of
sales staff, sales declined in the period.
Use of excuses,
justifications and
causality denials (%)*
Use of excuses, justifications and causality denials is measured as the % of
the sum of excuses, justifications and causality denials on total number of
attributional statements.
*Company level attributional properties used as independent variables.
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Appendix 2
Coding dimensions of attribution statements
An attribution statement:
‘One or more sentences (or part thereof) in which an outcome or effect (relating to a company’s
financial performance, i.e. revenue, expense or net income/earnings/profit item) is linked to one or
more antecedents for that outcome. Each attribution statement was coded on dimensions A01–A05
for the outcome/effect phrase and B10–B15 for each antecedent phrase.’
A. Outcome/effect
A01 Nature of the effect
1. Revenue
2. Expenses
3. Income/earnings/profit
A02 Valence of the effect
1. Positive (e.g. increase sales,
decrease expenses)
2. Negative (e.g. decrease sales,
increase expenses)
3. Unchanged/flat
A03 Time orientation of the effect
1. Past (effect concerns event of
preceding fiscal year)
2. Present (year under review)
3. Future
A04 Effect is expressed in quantitative
or qualitative terms
1. Quantitative
2. Qualitative
A05 Level of the explained effect
1. Division/product/geographic
segment
2. Company as a whole
B. Antecedent
B10 Explicitness of the antecedent-consequence relationship
1. Explicit
2. Implicit
3. Decomposition (effect = sales, cause = sales)
B11 Direction of antecedent-consequence relationship
1. Same direction
2. Opposite direction
B12 Time orientation of antecedent
1. Past (effect concerns event of preceding fiscal year)
2. Present (year under review)
3. Future
B13 Antecedent is expressed in quantitative or qualitative
terms
1. Quantitative
2. Qualitative
B14 Nature of explanation
1. Causal explanation
2. Accounting-technical explanation
B15 Locus of causality of antecedent
1. Internal cause, explicit reference to management
board
2. Internal cause, explicit reference to segment division
in the company
3. Internal cause with explicit reference to personnel
4. Other internal causes
5. External cause; cause is on sector or industry level
6. External cause; cause is on general economic level
7. Other external causes
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Appendix 3
Coding examples: attribution statements
(1) Antecedent-consequence relationship: an expense outcome is linked to two explanations, one
coded as technical-accounting and the other as causal:
The cost of merchandise sold decreased in 2003 compared to 2002 [effect] reflecting lower
spending on goods and services due to lower sales [antecedent (a) technical-accounting] as well as
favourable procurement conditions [antecedent (b) causal].
Sears Canada Inc. 2003 Annual Report, p. 28 (Canada Retail).
(2) Explicit explanations: characterised by a causal conjunction or connecting phrase (e.g. because of,
as a result of) and the verb in the sentence can refer to an explicit explanation (e.g. lead to, result in).
For example, consider the following positive outcome with an internal cause which uses ‘through’ as
the causal conjunction:
‘Foreign exchange losses decreased in the year [effect] through better management of the
consolidated entity affairs [antecendent – causal].’
Peptech 2003 Annual Report, p. 18 (Australia Biotech).
(3) Implicit explanation: when cause and effect are not explicitly related. These implicit explanations
are only taken into account when cause and effect can be reasonably linked to each other. In the
following causal explanations (an excuse and an entitlement) cause and effect are linked by the words
‘as a result of’:
‘The company’s hog production operations were negatively impacted in 2003 as a result of the
sharp rise in the Canadian dollar [antecedent – causal] which immediately reduced producer
revenues [effect].’
Maple Leaf Foods, 2003, p. 29 (Canadian Food producer).
‘We are continuing to realise gains in our primary margin [effect] as a result of actions to increase
overseas production and consolidate our supply base [antecedent – causal].’
Marks and Spencer, 2003, p. 3 (UK Retail).
(4) Time orientation: as shown below in a prospective causal statement:
‘The outsourcing of the liquid sorbital production at Atlas Point was completed this year
[antecedent – causal]. These changes are expected to yield a profit improvement next year [effect].’
Associated British Foods, 2003, p. 20 (UK Food producer).
(5) Technical-accounting attributions: explanations of accounting effects in financial accounting
language:
‘During fiscal 2003 . . . lower depreciation expense [antecedent: internal – technical-accounting]
contributed to improvement in gross profit and margin [effect].’
‘Other income increased to $3,350,000 in 2003 from $2,285,000 in 2002 [effect] primarily as a
result of $932,000 improvement in equity in net earning of affiliates [antecedent: internal –
technical-accounting].’
Florida Rock Industries Inc., 2003, pp. 8–9 (US Building Materials).
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